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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
SALT LAKE CITY CORPORATION,
a municipal corporation of
the State of Utah,
Plaintiff-Appellant,

Case No. 14659

vs.
UTAH WOOL PULLING COMPANY,
a Utah corporation,
Defendant-Respondent.

BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT

NATURE OF THE CASE
This case originated when Salt Lake City initiated condemnation proceedings against the defendant.

A settlement

was reached on the value of all of the defendant's property,
including the value of all defendant's land and buildings
and the piping, pumps, reservoirs and associated water diversion facilities,

for removing and using underground water at

their plant under their water rights.

The only issue left

in the case by stipulation was the value, if any, of the
defendant's water rights.

Plaintiff contended full market

value had been paid for defendant's properties and that standing alone, tl1e defendant's water rights had no value.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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asked time to determine, foolishly granted.

Three years

later defendant asked for trial on the issue.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
This matter was heard before the Honorable Gordon R.
Hall, Judge of the Third Judicial District Court in and for
Salt Lake County.

Despite the fact that the parties had

agreed to and defendant had been paid for all elements of
value for the defendant's property, including the value of all
well pipes, pumps, reservoirs and other facilities for diverting and using water from underground to the defendant's wool
pulling operation, the Court allowed the defendant to go
into all of the operations of the wool pullery and to examine
uses the water was put to and the cost of replacing the water,
as opposed only to the value of the water rights in their
location and without diversion facilities which has been paid
for.

The matter went to the jury with instructions from the

Judge, over objections of plaintiff, that they could consider
the diversionary uses to which the water was put and the value
of the water.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Plaintiff-appellant asks that the judgment on the verdict
be reversed, or set aside.

If set aside, that a new trial

be granted centering only on the value of the water rights in
locus, and not on water or water right values outside the aquifer basin in which defendant's property was located, or that the

may have produced through the water diversion facilities already
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
-2Machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.

paid for by defendant.
STATEMENT OF FACT
On May 8, 1973, the parties entered into a stipulation
(R 31-33) upon the market value for all properties to be condemned, except for the value, if any, of water rights, as set
forth in paragraph 7 of the parties' stipulation (R 31-32).
Judgment was entered (R 29,30) giving possession of the property to Salt Lake City Corporation, and for which payment,
pursuant to said stipulation, was made.

Included with the

amount paid to the defendant was the sum of $12,749.00 (R245),
the agreed market value of the wells, including all piping,
pumping connections, and reservoir facilities associated with
diverting the water from underground for use by the defendant
in the wool pullery.
The only issue, not fully resolved, was the value of the
defendant's water rights.

The plaintiff contended that the

defendant's water rights had no value in view of the fact
that defendant had been paid market value for all of the
diversionary facilities.

Merely by filing application with

the State Engineer, a right to drill water in the same area
for any amount could be obtained.

The value then of water

rights in the area where defendant's property was located was
only the value of the diversion facilities plus what it cost
to obtain the right to drill (R 268, 269).

Defendant's

witness Mr. C. Francis Solomon, verified this position in his
testimony (R 238-272) and also stated that a new well could
be drilled according to his investigation for a sum of not
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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to exceed $8,000.00 which would produce the same amount of
water defendant was producing from five wells (R 267).
Nearly three years later, some time just prior to
November 24, 1975, the defendant's attorney apparently called
the Court asking for a trial setting.

The notice of trial

setting (R 36) setting the matter for a non-jury trial, was
the result.

The defendant had decided to come to Court and

attempt to obtain a windfall.
Trial began June 4, l976 and defendant began with his
first witness in attempting to show the value of the use of
the water, as opposed to the value of the water right without
diversion facilities

(R 154-156).

Defendant's attempts to

do so were resisted by objection, a typical exchange of which
is found on line 9 through 19 R 156 and lines 1 through 17
R 157.

The Judge ruled against defendant sustaining plaintiff's

objection as to relevance (R 163) and defendant made a proffer
of proof contending that he could not proceed further and
could not put on a case without being allowed to tie the water
rights to their specialty use

(R 173 lines 27-39).

Defendant

contended that the value of the water rights had to be evaluated
with the total of the value of the property, which had already
been paid for.
Defendant admitted that the water rights had no market
value after the stipulation and payment by plaintiff (lines
20-25 R 177), and the plaintiff asked for a directed verdict
(R 186, 187).

The Court reversed itself, in error

(R 187, 188),

and allowed Mr. Fuller, over the plaintiff's objection to
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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proceed and bring in evidence concerning the specialty use
of the water and value of the water used in error.

The

plaintiff's motion to strike the testimony of Mr. Sum..-nerhays
as being irrelevant and improper was denied (R 191, 193).
Plaintiff objected to the valuation approach of Memory
Cain, defendant's expert appraiser, which was based on the
operation of the wool pullery (R 205) and to the value of
the total business (R 207, 208), and comparables outside the
aquifer basin in which the defendant's property was located
(R 209, lines 4-24, R 211-215).

He also improperly used the

inherent valuation approach (R 214, lines 28-30, R 215, line 1).
The Court acknowledged that the evidence of Mr. Cain came
in under the plaintiff's continuing objection (R 215).
The plaintiff moved to strike Memory Cain's entire
testimony concerning his inherent valuation methoJs and comparative sales based upon the fact that his comparables were
based upon remotely located sales of water and water rights
as opposed to sale of water or water rights in the basin
where defendant's property was located (R 233-237).
the Court ruled against plaintiff in error

Again

(R 237-238).

Plaintiff's expert witness, Fran Solomon, stated that
the defendant's water rights had no value because any purchaser
could readily obtain equivalent water rights and drill his own
well for a lesser amount of money than was paid to the defendants for their diversion facilities

(R 246-251).

He also indi-

cated that there were no comparable sales of water or water
rights in that area because

~ater

was so readily available with
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nothing more than drilling and diversion costs.
An expert engineer, Jay Bingham testified that water
quality of the same or better than that claimed by the defendant
could be and was produced under his direction, in the same
aquifer basin, but even further west and closer to the Salt
Lake than the location of the defendant's wells (R 308), and
in an even higher volume and at the same or better quality of
water (R 308-310).
Mr. Bingham also found no value in the water rights of
defendant other than their cost of the filing fee

(R 288, 289)

since they had already been paid for their diversion facilities.
Mr. Dee Hansen, Utah State Engineer, said there was no
cost and no value attaching to the water right (R 319), because
the area was open to drilling (R 320) and any person could
obtain the same or greater water rights in the same aquifer
basin than those held by the defendant (R 321) .

He further

stated that there was no charge for the water used under the
defendant's water rights (R 323) and the State Engineer
recognized the difference between the sale of water and the
water right itself.

The water right had no value

(R 328)

and the only cost of obtaining such rights would be between
$200.00 to $500.00 to have an engineer certify they had
proved up on the water rights (R 332) and the cost of drilling
the well, which in this case defendant had already paid for.
The Court erred again in allowing defense

~itness

Mr. Wederbrand to testify concerning the quality and naturo
of wells in the area, over obje>ctiort (R 337) v.'ithout 'En·in•J
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qualified him as an expert witness on water and water rights.
The Court at first excluded his testimony (R 198) and later
allowed it in (R 337) in error and over objections and later
motion to strike.

Plaintiff concedes Mr. Wederbrand was a

wool pullery expert but not a water or water rights expert,
which he admitted (R 197, 198).
The case was given to the jury which returned a verdict
in favor of the defendant and against the plaintiff in the
amount of $50,000.00.
POINT I
CERTIFIED WATER RIGHTS ARE SEPARABLE FROM
THE LAND AND CAN BE AND ARE VALUED AND SOLD
APART FROM THE LAND.
It is well settled that a certified water right, whether
riparian or otherwise, is separable from the land and can be
separately conveyed, 78 Am. Jur.2d, Waters Section 242.

Such

rights normally pass under a deed of conveyance of land to
which they are attached unless expressly reserved, 78 Am. Jur.
2d, Water Section 243.

In this case the value of such rights,

if any was expressly reserved from said sale in said stipulation.

Plaintiff contended full value had been paid, and

offered to allow defendant sell those water rights, separate
and apart from the land which is a common practice in this
State as verified by the Utah State Engineer (R 323).
fore,

There-

in this case the water rights should have been considered

separate and apart from the other properties and property
r1 ;hts of defendant, which were previously paid for and not

at issue in this case.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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POINT II
IN EMINENT DOMAIN, THE SOLE AND PRIMARY
QUERY IS DIRECTED TOWARD THE FAIR MARKET
VALUE OF THE CONDEMNED PROPERTY.
Under the Utah Constitution, Article I, Section 22,
the fair market value is the standard bearer of just compensation.

The Utah Supreme Court in Southern Pacific Company v.

Arthur, 10 U.2d 306, 352 P.2d 393 (1960), stated that such
was the test:
"The standard of what is just compensation in the
ordinary case is market value of the property
taken, that is what a willing buyer would pay to
a willing seller."
In the case at bar, the only property still at issue
was the certified water rights of defendant and the only
determination to be made by the Court was the value, if any,
of that specific property without confusing it or linking it
to any value previously appraised, estimated or paid for the
whole property or the water it could produce without the
diversion facilities which had already been paid for over
three years prior.

The test was what a willing buyer would

pay for the water rights alone in that aquifer basin.
Can you see a willing buyer paying $50,000.00 as the
jury contends, or $80,000.00 as the defendant contends when
that well informed buyer knows he can obtain such rights for
less than $500.00 at most?
The value of the land, the buildings and water diversion
facilities and use to which water was put at the wool pullery
was, at the time of trial, irrelevant.

The test was what

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR,
may contain errors.
-8-

would a willins buyer pay for only the water rights.

The

testimony of plaintiff's three witnesses in Court was that
the water rights themselves had no value for the reason that
anyone could obtain the right to drill a well and obtain as
much water as was wanted in that aquifer basin where the
defendant's property was located.

See Statement of Facts.

Such rights admittedly are not so readily obtainable in other
areas of the State, and, therefore, valuations of sales in
other aquifer basins would not and did not have any relevance
to this sale.

It was error for the Court to allow this informa-

tion into evidence, over plaintiff's objections and motions to
strike.
POINT III
IT WAS ERROR TO ALLOW THE DEFENDANT TO ASSIGN
A PECULIAR OR SPECIALTY VALUE TO PROPERTY
BEING TAKEN UNDER ENINENT Dm1AIN.
The well settled law in this area is stated in 29(a)
Corpus Juris Secondum, Eminent Domain, 136(7), which states
the rule as follows:
"The concept of market value judicially applied
applies to the property condemned (citing cases)
not to the person of the owner (citing cases), and
only that value need be considered which is attached
to the property (citing cases).
In determining
the amount of compensation, or the market value
of the property taken, generally, no account
should be given to the values or necessities
peculiar to the owner (citing 43 cases sustaining
this rule and l against in federal and state
jurisdictions), or similarly to values or necessities peculiar to the condemnee (citing cases),
nor should account to given to the purposes for
which the property is taken (citing cases)."
(Comrnent added)
The only case above mentioned as being against the
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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rule was the case of Kimball Laundry Company v. U.S., Neb.,
69 S.Ct. 1434, 338 U.S. 1, 93 L.ed. 1765, 7 A.L.R.2d 1280,
wherein the Army temporarily condemned the plaintiff's
laundry for the duration of the war.

Concerning the issue

of peculiar value, the Court allowed compensation for the loss
or damage to the laundry's trade routes which the owners
could not service during and because of the temporary condemnation.
In view of the foregoing, the only value defendant should
be allowed to place on the water rights was the value, if
any, a willing buyer would pay for them without diversion
facilities, for which plaintiff had already paid, and in the
aquifer basin where the rights were located.
POINT IV
THE VALUATION OF THE ~\TATER PRODUCED BY
DEFENDANT'S CERTIFIED WATER RIGHTS, THROUGH
DIVERSION FACILITIES ALREADY PAID FOR, AND
THE SPECIAL PURPOSES FOR WHICH THE DEFENDANT
WAS USING THEM, BASED ON IMPROPER VALUES
AND VALUES OUTSIDE THE AREA \\THERE THE
PROPERTY WAS LOCATED WERE NOT PROPER FACTORS
IN DETERMINING HARKET VALUE AND SHOULD NOT
P~VE BEEN ALLOWED INTO EVIDENCE.
A condemnation must be based upon the fair market
value of the property taken, which in this case should have
been the value only of defendant's certified water rights in
locus and defendant is not entitled to a profit, which allowing this case to stand would be.
29 A

C.J.S

Eminent Domain§ 136(8) states:

"It is not proper to attempt to arrive at value
by adding elements of value together, or after
awarding full compensation for the property taken,
then to allow additional compensation for those
Sponsored
by the S.J. Quinney
Law Library.
digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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This Court agrees with this position, see State of Utah
v. Tedesco, 4 U.2d 31, 286 P.2d 785, and State of Utah v.
Tedesco, 4 U.2d 248, 291 P.2d 1028.
The defendant may argue that such is not proper and cite
Sigurd City v. State, 142 P.2d 154, and Whitmore v. Utah Fuel,
42

u.

470, 131 P. 907 as grounds for admission of inherent

values evidence, but neither case is applicable here.
In the Sigurd case, the City condemned the irreplaceable
spring water used for irrigation on the land of several ranchers
leaving the land worth considerably less than it was before.
The City did not condemn the land and the Court allowed evidence in concerning the inherent value of the whole.
conclusions are not applicable to this case.

Its

In the case

at bar the defendant was fully compensated for and agreed upon
the market value of the land, buildings and all water diversion and other facilities located on the property.

Only the

right by which defendant removed the water from underground
was to be valued.

Defendant admitted and stipulated that

the water rights in question had no value after the taking
(R 186, 187).

If they had no value after how could they have

any value before the take.

The value should be the same

before and after and defendant should not be allowed to have
it both ways.
In the Whitmore case, there was no market established for
the water of the defendant in a condemnation case, because the
water was so scarce in the area that no one would sell their
(The opposite of the case at bar, water so plentiful
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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no one will buy.)

In this case the Court allowed pecuniary

damages measured by the different uses to which he had applied
it.

This case is also inapplicable to the case at bar.
In order to justify departing the the usual use of market

value, the condemnee must show that it is impossible to value
the property without dispensing with the general rule, see
State v. American, 82 S.D. 231, 144 N.W.2d 25, 32 (1966).
In the case at bar, the value the defendant placed upon
the use of water and the purposes for which the defendant
was using them is not market value and should not have been
allowed into evidence by the Court so as to confuse the jury.
This was done in error.

A related case on this point is

Redevelopment Agency of Salt Lake City v. Barusha,

(August

1974) 526 P.2d 47, wherein the Utah Court stated as follows:
"The trial court did not err in its ruling market
value is not a multiple, for the value in use of
property for a particular purpose is not market
value but merely a factor in determining such
value.
It is generally improper to express an
opinion of value in use in terms of so much money.
There is a clear distinction between value and
use and market value; a given piece of land
(in this case the certified water rights) has
only one market value and not a certain value
for one purpose and different market value for
another purpose."
(Emphasis added)
In the case at bar, the entire basis for the defendant's
case and his presentation to the jury was the use of the water
and the cost to reproduce it, but defendant's values were not
based on the water's value in the aquifer basin where the
defendant's property was located, which value was zero, but
rather, it was based on remote valuations in three other areas
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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of the state.

It was error for the Court to allow the intro-

duction of defendant's use valuations and the remote and
improper comparable sales evidence.
POINT V
IT WAS ERROR FOR THE TRIAL COURT TO ALLOW
COMPARABLE SALES FROM HEBER VALLEY, CORRINNE
AND WEBER COUNTY, ALL OF WHICH WERE OUTSIDE
THE AQUIFER BASIN IN WHICH THE DEFENDANT'S
PROPERTY WAS LOCATED.
The test of whether comparable sales should be allowed
in evidence is set forth in the case of State v. Larkin, 27
U.2d 295, 495 P.2d 817

(1972), which quoted with approval the

case of State v. Wood, 22 U.2d 317, 452 P.2d 872.
"Whether evidence of the value of other property
should be admitted depends upon whether they are
sufficiently similar in character, location and
other factors which would influence value that
they meet the test of 'reasonable comparability'
so they can reasonably be regarded as having
probative value as to the worth of the property
in question.
Because of the responsibility of the
trial judge as the authority in charge of the trial
he is allowed considerable latitude as to his
judgment upon the matter and his ruling should
not be distrubed unless it appears he was clearly
in error and that this redownded to the prejudice of the complaining party."
In this case, the Court justified the lower court's
exclusion of comparable sales in Tremonton and Brigham City,
although the condemnation action was in Box Elder County
on grounds that the sales from these two areas was too remote
as to distance and type of area.

This rule should have been

applied in the case at bar.
The water sales from Heber City, Corrinne and lveber
County were too far distant as to type and area (underground
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water readily available in the defendant's area was not in
the others), they were not sufficiently similar in character
(spring water), location or other factors and offered no
reasonable comparability to the property sought to be valued
in this case.

Additionally the Court's allowance of a

determination of value to be placed on the sale of water in
these remote areas as opposed to the value of an underground
water right in the defendant's plentiful water basin was
error and prejudiced plaintiff's case.
The fact that there were no sales of water or water
rights in the aquifer basin where the defendant's property
was located was amply explained by the plaintiff's three
witnesses, that is that there had been no sales of water.
Plaintiff's witnesses testified such rights had no value
because anyone could obtain a right to drill for water in the
area and remove as much as they deemed expedient, with only
the cost of drilling, which defendant in this case had been
paid for, and therefore no one would purchase such water or
water rights in the area.
POINT VI
IT \vAS ERROR FOR TilE COURT TO ALLmv AN
INSTRUCTION ON SPECIALTY PROPERTY
The Court, over plaintiff's objection and exception,
allowed defendant's instruction No. 4 (R 94), the Court's
No. 15 (R 118) to be given in error.

Plaintiff contends this

was error for the reasons stated in Point II and IV hereof.
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II
CONCLUSION
The Court erred in reversing itself and allowing
defendant to.provide allegations concerning the use and inherent valuation of the water to defendants, and also in
allowing value to be placed on water used as opposed to
strictly the value of certified water rights without diversion facilities in the area where the property was condemned.
The Court erred in allowing the defendant to introduce
evidence concerning inherent values and comparable sales of
water and water rights in other areas not associated with
the aquifer basin in which the defendant's property was
located.

The Court erred in refusing to strike the testimony

of defendant's expert witness concerning the inherent and
comparable sales values of defendant's water based on such
information.

Therefore, the judgment on the verdict in the

lower court should either be reversed and this Court find
that the value of the defendant's water rights were zero,
the defendant having received full market value, or at the
most $500.00, or that the verdict be set aside and the
plaintiff-appellant be granted a new trial.
Respectfully submitted,
ROGER F. CUTLER
City Attorney
RAY L. HONTGONERY
Assistant City Attorney
Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellant
101 City & County Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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